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Introduction
The Care Programme Approach (CPA) was introduced in England in 1991 to provide shape and coherence to what had often been haphazard, uncoordinated attempts to provide support in the community for people with severe mental illness. This paper explores the history and development of the CPA and identifies the key events, audits, evaluations and initiatives that shaped this policy and concludes by identifying possible explanations for the continued under-performance of this English version of case management.
A brief background to the introduction of the CPA
The Audit Commission (1986) called for radical changes in the organisation and management of community services in the mid-1980s. Community care appeared to be failing patients and families (Wallace, 1986) and worrying numbers of mentally ill people were becoming homeless (Belcher, 1988) . The killing of a social worker by a mentally ill woman added to concerns when it transpired that the patient had been able to 'drop out of sight' of mental health services whenever she was discharged from hospital. The 'Spokes Inquiry' recommended that health authorities set up a register of vulnerable mentally ill patients living in the community and appoint keyworkers (DHSS, 1988) .
In response, the 'Griffiths Report' recommended targeted care packages and the appointment of case managers who would assess the needs of the mentally ill person, co-ordinate the input of various agencies and work closely with the family (Griffiths, 1988) . These recommendations formed the backdrop to the White Paper, 'Caring for People ' (Department of Health, 1989a) . But specific proposals concerning mental health were dwarfed and delayed by the NHS and Community Care Act, 1990 , which contained extensive measures to reorganise all hospital and community services (Hadley, Muijen, Goldman, & Shepherd, 1996; Reynolds & Thornicroft, 1999) .
Nonetheless, local authority social services introduced a care management system, in which social worker care managers assessed social needs, designed 'packages of care' and purchased services for vulnerable people (Department of Health, 1989b) . A directive followed that advised psychiatrists not to discharge patients from hospital without an individual care plan agreed with the local authority (Department of Health, 1989a) . A second circular required health and local authorities to implement the CPA by April 1991 for all people with mental illness referred to specialist psychiatric services (Department of Health, 1990 ).
The Care Programme Approach (CPA)
The CPA was based on the principles of case management, developed in the USA to target resources at those considered most in need (Intagliata, 1982; Ovretveit, 1993; Stein & Test, 1980) . Different models of case management stressed different characteristics (Mueser et al., 1998) , but in England these could be determined locally, provided that the fundamental features of the CPA were implemented (See Table 1 ). The relationship between different case management approaches and the CPA is discussed elsewhere (Simpson, Miller & Bowers, in press ). Names of those subject to the CPA were recorded on 'CPA registers', introducing paperwork that became the leitmotif of the new policy (Simpson, 1998) .
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Things were not getting better
The ability of 'community care' policies to provide humane, safe support for severely distressed people remained in doubt (Hogman, 1992) . Unkempt and disturbed men and women were sleeping rough in apparently increasing numbers (Craig et al., 1993; Craig & Timms, 1992; Scott, 1993) . Mental health was now a key policy area in the government's 'Health of the Nation' strategy (Department of Health, 1992) but when the media reported and arguably exploited a series of tragic incidents involving people with mental illness pressure mounted on the government to do more (Coid, 1994) . Most influential was the case of Christopher Clunis, a man with mental illness, who killed Jonathon Zito (Hallam, 2002) . This rare incident involved the death of a total stranger and fuelled the public's anxieties, leading the government to introduce independent inquiries whenever a mentally ill person committed homicide (NHS Executive, 1994) . The ensuing rash of inquiries and reports (with attendant publicity) repeatedly highlighted breakdowns in communication between agencies and individuals (Shepherd, 1996) . People were still 'falling through the net'.
Further guidance signalled the government's determination to prioritise the needs of people with 'severe mental illness ' (Department of Health, 1993; . Unfortunately, the failure to publish a definition of severity created disagreement and confusion (Powell & Slade, 1996; Walker, 1998) .
Initial evaluations of the CPA
Initial evaluations identified many difficulties affecting implementation of the CPA (See Table 2 ). Psychiatrists in particular perceived it as an encroachment on their clinical judgement and practice. They believed the basic requirements of good practice were already in place and that the CPA was bureaucratic and over-structured (North et al., 1993) . Staff were also concerned that with the introduction of CPA registers they would be involved in a more explicit form of surveillance or social control . Consequently, the CPA was being implemented selectively and was not applied to all mentally ill patients (Schneider, 1993) .
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] Supervision Registers and Supervised Discharge
The 'Ten Point Plan', aimed at tightening procedures, introduced supervision registers for patients considered most at risk and in need of increased support (Secretary of State for Health, 1994) . Supervision registers were more often seen as another controlling response to the needs of mentally ill people, rather than being designed to improve quality of care (Godin & Scanlon, 1997; Kingdon, 1996; Nolan et al., 1998; Ryan, 1994) and were rarely employed (Bindman et al., 1999; Turner et al., 1999) . Together with homicide inquiries, many suspected they pointed towards an emerging 'blame culture' with clinicians being held responsible for untoward incidents (Peck & Parker, 1998) . The aim of providing community mental health care in the least restrictive environment (House of Commons, 1985) was being lost, with mentally ill people now being treated with different rather than fewer restrictions (Ryan, 1994) .
Supervised discharge was also flagged up and eventually introduced in April 1996 under the Mental Health (Patients in the Community) Act, 1995. This required certain patients to adhere to an agreed care plan but there was little enthusiasm amongst clinicians for yet another modification to the CPA (Burns, 2000) . 'Designated supervisors', most likely the CPA keyworker, now had powers to 'take and convey' patients to where their care plan specified they should reside or receive treatment. Many thought such measures would impinge on their therapeutic relationships with users (Coffey, 1997; Rogers, 1996) . Others argued that such a position was naïve or dishonest and created a 'pernicious split' within mental health services between those directly involved in restricting the liberty of service users and those not (Godin & Scanlon, 1996) . Others saw the increased supervision of service users as validating early concerns that the CPA would foreground the 'medical model' and enable the extension of coercive psychiatric practices into the community (Onyett, 1998b) .
Building Bridges
The continued failure to properly implement and monitor the CPA was severely criticised by politicians who identified fragmentation of services and poor inter-disciplinary co-ordination. They also criticised the lack of detailed data that would enable proper evaluation of the CPA (Health Committee Report, 1994). Suitable information technology was still treated with some suspicion within the health service (Ferguson, 1996) . This damning report, coupled with the 'The Report of the Inquiry into the Care and Treatment of Christopher Clunis' (Ritchie & Lingham, 1994) and at risk. 'Building Bridges' also contained the first official attempt to define severe mental illness. However, providing a 'framework definition' and continuing to recommend locally agreed operational definitions ensured that confusion and disagreement remained (Huxley et al., 1998) .
Tracking the tiers of the CPA
Localities developed different grades of the CPA, depending on the users' severity of illness or complexity of need, in order to target restricted resources at those in most need and to reduce administration required for those seeing one worker (Wells, 1997) . Some introduced a 'continuum' that allowed a more individualised response to changing needs, others introduced 'levels' where each person was placed on a particular 'tier' of the CPA (Margerison, 1998) .
Again, solutions were decided locally (NHS Training Division, 1995) ensuring little consistency, with patients allocated according to different criteria including diagnosis, number of professionals involved, and severity of illness (Margerison, 1998; Marlowe et al., 1999; Sone, 1992) . As a result, social service and health employees working alongside each other could end up employing separate and contradictory systems (Miller & Freeman, 2003) .
Still Building Bridges
Tiers, supervision registers and supervised discharge deepened the confusion surrounding the CPA (Department of Health, 1995; Hamilton & Roy, 1995) . A survey of all 180 English NHS mental health trusts reported widespread variation in the number of people allocated to the CPA and different tiers, not explained by variations in population need (Bindman et al., 1999) . 'Still Building Bridges' (Department of Health, 1999) confirmed the continuing uneven implementation of the policy. Few authorities provided holistic inter-disciplinary assessments and assessment systems "varied significantly between different professional groups, different agencies and within agencies", making appraisal of needs difficult (ibid: 6). Attempts to develop joint recording systems encountered major problems reconciling different computer systems. There were few agreed procedures for risk assessments, care plans were often found to be ineffective and some areas had difficulty keeping up with regular reviews. Service users and carers were more likely to be invited to reviews but often found them formal and intimidating and arranged at the convenience of medical staff. Written information on the CPA and other services was seldom available.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] Increased contacts, admissions and costs
The Cochrane systematic reviews of various case management programs in the USA, Australia and Europe concluded that such approaches increased patient contact but approximately doubled the numbers admitted to psychiatric hospitals, with no significant advantages over 'standard care' on psychiatric or social variables (Marshall et al., 2001 ). Increased bed use was highest in studies in England where the impact of the CPA, risk management and concerns about untoward incidents may have fuelled figures (Turner et al., 1999) . Psychiatric hospitals faced enormous pressures; admission rates rose with bed occupancies exceeding capacity, compulsory admissions soared and additional use of non-NHS inpatient facilities escalated costs (Gould, 2002; Simpson, 2000) . Consequently, the CPA was dismissed as an ineffective approach beyond maintaining contact with patients and providing "useful administrative functions" (University of York & NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, 2000:p1) . Assertive community approaches were recommended as more beneficial than 'standard' CPA (Marshall & Lockwood, 1999) . However, evaluation of case management programs is a highly complex and contentious issue (Brugha & Glover, 1998; Burgess & Pirkis, 1999; Rosen & Teesson, 2001; Ziguras & Stuart, 2000) and is explored by the authors in relation to the CPA elsewhere (Simpson, Miller & Bowers, in press ).
'Community care has failed': the risky shift Claims persisted that 'community care' had failed. 'Learning the lessons', produced by the Zito Trust (established by Jayne Zito, a psychiatric social worker and the widow of Jonathan Zito), summarised the findings and recommendations of 54 mental health inquiry reports published in England and Wales (Shepherd, 1996) . The Zito Trust argued that mental health policy was too often "a disaster" and that the chances of efficient communication taking place appeared negligible given the failure to implement the CPA and the dreadful state of basic services (ibid: p10). Others were adamant that rather than more supervision there needed to be an improvement in the level of engagement, care and support provided to mentally ill people, especially those from black and other minority ethnic groups (Francis, 1996; Morgan & Hemming, 1999) .
Suggestions were also made that the same pressures that had produced the focus on risk assessment and management, now central to the CPA (Busfield, 2000) , had encouraged 'defensive' psychiatric practices (Burns Tom & Priebe, 1999; Deahl et al., 2000; Smyth & Hoult, 2000) , resulting in 'reinstitutionalisation' within services (Turner & Priebe, 2002) . The frequently implied association between mental illness and homicide led Taylor and Gunn (1999) to conduct a detailed review of criminal statistics between 1957 and people with a mental illness committing homicide over the 38 years, and a 3% annual decline in their contribution to official statistics despite the enormous increase in the number of people being cared for in the community. Whilst society had witnessed an increase in murders, there had been an annual fall in the number committed by those with a mental illness. Similar findings have been reported internationally (Walsh & Fahy, 2002) . A separate review of 14 homicide inquiries involving mentally ill people did however emphasise inadequacies in the planning of care (Parker & McCulloch, 1999) . These findings were given further weight by the National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide by People with Mental Illness in 'Safer Services' (Appleby et al., 1999 ). Considerable failings were described, particularly in the care of people recently discharged from hospital, the very target group the CPA was originally introduced to support. Any clinical value of the CPA was reputedly "in danger of being undermined by its administrative demands" (ibid: p86).
Users' experiences of the CPA
Service users' experiences of the CPA have been consistently disappointing.
Relatively small studies repeatedly reported little awareness of the policy, patchy allocation and identification of keyworkers, limited involvement in care planning, poor use of care plans, and mixed experiences of CPA review meetings (Lawson et al., 1999; McDermott, 1998; Phillips, 1998; Simpson, 1999a; Wolfe et al., 1997) .
A CPA audit in 1998 surveyed 503 patients across five NHS trusts (Webb et al., 2000) and confirmed that key policy components were not being implemented, with wide variation between trusts. Research conducted across England by user researchers reported similar results (Rose, 2003; Rose, 2001 ). Rose (2001) lamented the lack of transparency in the CPA process and outlined the serious implications of these findings, describing the failure to provide comprehensive care plans as "almost a dereliction of duty" (ibid: p48). The impression gained from staff was that the CPA was seen as "just a paper exercise, which increases their workload with no benefit to care" (ibid: p49). Yet where CPA arrangements are more successfully administered and where service users experienced greater involvement in their care, greater levels of satisfaction are expressed (Beeforth et al., 1994; Webb et al., 2000) . This suggests a paradox in which workers complain of the 'bureaucracy' of the CPA but service users value the written care plans and information that care co-ordinators are mandated to deliver.
Carers' experiences of the CPA
The limited research on carers' experiences of the CPA consists mainly of relatively small qualitative studies (Allen, 1998; Carpenter & Sbaraini, 1996; Huang & Slevin, 1999; Simpson, 1999a) . Carers commonly reported having little or no knowledge of the CPA, keyworker details or emergency arrangements, and of rarely being involved in the care planning process with their views seldom sought or listened to. Carers' concerns often overlapped with their experiences of mental health services generally.
What went wrong? Money, managerialism and the CPA
The CPA was introduced against a socio-political backdrop that included a concerted effort to reduce public spending across government departments (Onyett, 1998a) . No direct funding accompanied the CPA and special project funding required complex arrangements with social services (Peck & Parker, 1998) . Additionally, two-thirds of resources for mental health services continued to be allocated to inpatient care with less than a quarter spent on day and community care (Audit Commission, 1994) . Lack of suitable community resources was estimated to account for between 24% and 58% of Reorganisation under the NHS and Community Care Act, 1990 , and the establishment of NHS trusts also had an impact by increasing the confidence and authority of trust managers (Peck & Parker, 1998) . Pertinently, the introduction and subsequent amendments to the CPA were addressed via circulars addressed to managers within health and social services, creating resentment and resistance amongst many clinicians who viewed managerial attempts to comply with the requirements as "cumbersome and bureaucratic" (Peck & Parker, 1998) . There was a failure to sufficiently motivate the workforce and ensure the policy was integrated into everyday practice (Bonner, 2000) . Psychiatrists in particular often ignored the CPA and supervision registers because they saw them as centralised bureaucratic systems, imposed with little consultation and offering little benefit to the service user .
Alongside the rise of managerialism in the NHS came the introduction of targets, standards, performance measures and financial incentives. The percentage coverage of the CPA for eligible users became a measure of performance, with success linked to increased funding of local services. Such initiatives added to the suspicion and resentment of clinical staff faced with implementing the CPA when managers were keen to emphasise 100% coverage 'regardless of the reality of service provision that such statistics masked' (Peck, 1997; Peck & Parker, 1998 ). An unforeseen effect, perhaps, of a healthcare policy managed by outcome measures (McCartney & Brown, 1999) .
Sectorisation and community mental health teams (CMHTs)
Successful execution of the CPA was also dependent on the development of multi-disciplinary CMHTs (Shepherd, 1995) . In 1994 there were just over 500 CMHTs in England, by 1996 almost 900 . The 'Spectrum of Care' guidance (Department of Health, 1996) made explicit their role as the cornerstone of specialist mental health service provision and by 1997 CMHTs operated in 82% of trusts in England and Wales (Brooker & White, 1997) .
Each CMHT provided mental health services to the population of a geographical catchment area but the sectorisation of mental health care had developed without central planning, unlike in other European countries, and with little evaluation (Johnson & Thornicoft, 1993) . Consequently, sectorised teams were engulfed with conflicting demands from referrers and policy makers and struggled to provide a service focused on the needs of people with severe mental illness (Galvin & McCarthy, 1994; Onyett et al., 1994) .
They also tended not to offer out-of-hours services, relying on inpatient services (Johnson & Thornicoft, 1993) .
Despite these and other difficulties, a Cochrane systematic review concluded that the CMHT management of people with severe mental illness increased the maintenance of contact, reduced suicides, reduced the length of hospital admissions, reduced costs and increased patient satisfaction (Simmonds et al., 2001) . No significant differences in clinical symptomatology or social functioning were detected. However, these conclusions were drawn from just five eligible studies, just two of which related to typical CMHTs in England (Holloway, 2001) . Numerous factors are likely to impact on the effectiveness of teams providing CPA-style community care (Burns & Priebe, 1996) . These include bed availability (Tyrer et al., 1998) , caseload size and content of therapeutic interventions , quality of the therapeutic relationship (McCabe & Priebe, in press) and a complex interrelationship between personal/social and psychiatric factors (Wakefield et al., 1998) .
Teamwork and the CPA
The effective discharge of individual CPA responsibilities can only occur in the context of a 'well-functioning team' under good leadership (NHS Training Division, 1995; Shepherd, 1995) . Key principles identified included the need to clarify goals and procedures, improve leadership skills, clarify roles, address issues of responsibility and accountability, and to support the team.
But CMHTs have been the focus of tensions and difficulties and many of these prerequisites are rarely in place. This has led to high workloads, role ambiguity, stress and low morale for many CMHT staff (Brooker & White, 1997; Chalk, 1999; Edwards et al., 2000; . Team leadership is often fraught as most CMHT managers lack the knowledge, expertise and support to effectively manage teams that contain professionals with different levels of status, remuneration and power and conflicting educational, cultural and philosophical backgrounds .
Many of the difficulties faced in implementing the CPA and executing the keyworker role related to problems encountered in working as part of a team (Miller et al., 2001; Simpson, 1999b) . The CPA lacked a unifying philosophy of care whilst presuming inter-professional collaboration, but often served only to intensify pre-existing tensions and rivalries amongst team members (Miller & Freeman, 2003) . Sharing of professional knowledge, skills and philosophies can create more integrated, collaborative working within teams (Miller et al., 2001 ) but clinicians within CMHTs often see moves towards greater role overlap as threatening and respond by employing defensive manoeuvres and inflexible role demarcation . Staff may hold contradictory attitudes towards role boundaries, either seeking to remove boundaries in order to facilitate closer teamwork or fearing that the erosion of boundaries would result in role confusion (Brown et al., 2000) . Such are the 'messy realities' of mental health care (Warne et al., 2000) . Changes included the complete integration of the CPA with social services' care management system, with a single point of referral for the two agencies.
The similarities, differences and co-existence of these two systems had been the source of enormous confusion throughout the existence of the CPA (Burns, 1997; Hadley et al., 1996; Holloway, 1991; Marshall et al., 1995; Schneider, 1993) . Other changes are detailed in Table 3 . The NSFMH also aimed to address the needs of carers, adding more responsibilities to hardpressed CMHT staff.
Further initiatives including assertive outreach and early intervention teams were contained within the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000a), with promises of significantly increased funding for mental health services. But, in light of ongoing difficulties in achieving effective co-ordination and communication, some were concerned that additional teams and extended working hours could create new gaps through which patients might slip (Deahl et al., 2000) . There are also worries that just as CMHTs are beginning to find their feet, staff will escape the excessive responsibilities and overwork of CMHTs to join the new, better-resourced teams. CMHTs may be undermined just as we begin to understand what makes them work (Burns & Catty, 2002) .
Whether the increased funding of services will bolster and improve CMHTs and the latest manifestation of the CPA remains to be seen. In 2002, Health Minister Jacqui Smith admitted that still just 85% mentally ill patients received a CPA care plan when discharged from hospital (Smith, 2002) .
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Conclusion
The CPA has improved the ability of services to maintain contact with people with severe mental illness but overall the CPA has not been effectively implemented and the following factors contributed to its failure. The policy was introduced at a time when health and social workers felt under attack from unsympathetic political leaders. No additional funding accompanied the CPA at the same time as health and social service budgets were being cut.
Little or no training was provided. The imposition of the policy by politicians and managers was associated with charges that community care had failed whilst there was no acknowledgement of the good work that was often being undertaken within a seriously under-funded and complex area of healthcare.
The CPA failed to explicitly build on the knowledge, skills and abilities of the workforce so was seen as a largely bureaucratic and superfluous addition to a 
